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I. Introduction.
Over the past 4 years, 7 major league sports franchises have moved and several more
relocations have been proposed.1   This mobility of sports franchises has created a political
uproar in the cities that have lost their sports teams and has led to calls in Congress to regulate
the location of teams (Vader, 1995; Malkin, 1997; Norton, 1995).  Cities desiring to acquire or
retain sports franchises have invested millions of dollars in building stadiums, constructing
parking facilities and other infrastructure, and even guaranteeing ticket sales to make their city
more attractive to potential teams.
These investments and subsidies represent a transfer of resources to city taxpayers for the
dubious benefit of supporting a segment of the entertainment industry and maintaining a city’s
“major league” reputation (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1991).  In fact, analysts have
concluded that the net economic benefits for a city to have a sports franchises are much more
limited than voters and political leaders have assumed (Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade and Dye,
1990).
A different set of studies have looked at the motivation of sports franchises to relocate
and the role that local governments play in attracting and retaining teams (Shropshire, 1995;
Euchner, 1993).  What is clear from these studies is that stadium ownership plays an important
role in the decision to relocate.
In an earlier paper, we examined the factors leading Major League Baseball franchises to
relocate using data from 1950 to 1995 (Mildner and Strathman, 1996).  In this paper, we extend
our analysis to look at the National Basketball Association from 1960 to 1995.  Our intent is to
extend this line of research to cover the other major league sports, but we present here the data
for these two sports along with some location data for professional hockey and football.  The
paper proceeds as follows: a model of the team relocation decision process, a description of our
data set, our analysis of that data, and a concluding section.
II.  Model.
In our model, there are three agents in the decision to relocate: the franchise owner, the
stadium owner, and the local government.  We assume that the franchise owner is primarily
concerned about the net revenues of his sports team.  That is, their goal is profit maximization.
The key determinants of net revenues are players salaries, stadium rent, television income, ticket
revenue, capital gains from franchise value, and subsidies from the local government.  The
stadium owner is also primarily concerned about net revenue for this facility which includes
stadium rent, concession revenue, and capital gains from stadium value.  Local governments are
concerned about two things: the presence of the team and the cost of subsidies to the taxpayer.
In our model, there are three possible institutional arrangements: either the stadium is
owned by government, the sports franchise owner, or by a third party.  Our hypothesis is that
stadium ownership by local government leads to subsidies being given to local franchises and
leads to a greater likelihood of team relocation.   Because local government officials exaggerate
the economic benefits of the presence of a sports franchise and discount the costs of subsidies
paid by taxpayers, they are likely to be held hostage by the sports franchises that threaten to
move.  When the local government is also the stadium or arena owner, they have greater
opportunities to make those subsidies in a way that is hidden from taxpayers: below market rent
payments, subsidized loans, low-cost transportation facilities, or tax abatements or below market
value tax assessment, among others.  Thus, one reason that sports franchises operating in
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municipally owned facilities are more mobile is the “stadium subsidy mechanism” that municipal
ownership allows.
When the stadium owner is also the sports franchise owner, the local government has a
greater difficulty in making payments to keep franchise in the local area.  More importantly, the
franchise owner now has a large incentive not to relocate; because he owns the same sports
facility that his team uses, the relocation decision will mean that the stadium will lose value.
Since in many cases, the value of the stadium equals or exceeds the value of the franchise, the
owner will only leave a city when the value of the stadium is already very low or the increase in
net revenue from moving to a larger market is very high.2  Hence the second reason that
municipal ownership of stadiums leads to more franchise mobility is the “stadium value motive”.
We would expect that sports franchises that own their own stadiums to have a lower
likelihood of moving.  For the intermediate case where stadiums are owned by a third party, we
would expect to see a level of mobility that ranks between franchise ownership of their own
stadiums and municipal stadium ownership.  In this intermediate case, the franchise owner does
not have the stadium value motive to stay, but the threat to leave will likely result in reduced
stadium rent or a revenue-sharing arrangement with the stadium owner.  And since the local
government does not have the stadium subsidy mechanism, the threat to leave does not easily
generate offers from local government to subsidize the move.
In practice, third party ownership has become rather rare.  Our previous paper (Mildner
and Strathman, 1996) indicated that third party ownership had the same effect as team ownership
for baseball franchises.  Hence, for the model, we estimate the effect of public ownership alone.
No data is currently available that allows us to measure the tax subsidy issue directly.  Instead we
will follow the team relocation decision alone.
III.  Data
A.  Franchise Data
For this research, we have developed two data sets: one for Major League Baseball
(MLB), 1950-1995, and one for the National Basketball Association (NBA), 1960-1995.3   The
baseball data set has 1,026 observations of team-years, while the basketball data set has 681
observations.  Data was collected on team performance, attendance, metropolitan population,
franchise ownership, stadium/arena characteristics, and stadium/arena ownership.
The data for the two sports are summarized in Table 1 by decade, along with the first six
years of the 1990’s.  As can be seen in the growth of franchise years, both sports underwent a
significant expansion between the 1960’s and the 1970’s, although by comparison baseball is a
relatively established sport.  The growth in franchise years per decade for baseball was 24% for
1950-69 and for 1960-79, and slowed down to 6% for 1970-89.  The comparable numbers for the
NBA are 86% for 1960-79 and 23% for 1970-89.  The growth in the 1970’s also reflects the
merger of the NBA with the American Basketball Association in 1976.
The relative stability of baseball is also demonstrated in long metropolitan tenure, as well
as ownership and stadium use.  Since NBA was founded in 1947, the opportunity to establish
metropolitan tenure is not the same as baseball.  Nevertheless, the difference (or at least the
percentage difference) in each of these “tenure” measures has been reduced, indicating reduced
rates of ownership tenure in basketball, and the end of basketball’s rapid expansion years.
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Stadium age and stadium capacity data indicate two important trends in both sports.
First, the late 1960’s and 1970’s were an era for new stadium construction (and hence declining
age) and rising stadium capacity, with basketball arenas tending to be much smaller and newer
than baseball facilities.  Between the 1960’s and the 1990’s, baseball stadiums grew by 0.47%
per year in capacity, while basketball arenas grew by 1.0% per year, more than twice as fast.
One reason for the slow growth in baseball stadium capacity is that unlike the other
sports, baseball has always had always had a significantly higher capacity than average
attendance, so that capacity growth has a lesser impact on team attendance.  Of course, the
popularity of each sport and the physical limitation on human eyesight also play a role.
Table 1
Franchise and Stadium Trends
Baseball and Basketball Compared
1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s
Franchise Years MLB 160 198 246 260 162
NBA 91 192 236 162
Average Metro Population MLB 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.6 6.0
of Franchise (millions) NBA 5.8 4.6 5.2 5.4
Average Owner Tenure MLB 16.6 13.0 15.2 11.6 14.0
(years) NBA 7.3 7.3 8.5 11.2
Average Metro Tenure MLB 47.6 36.3 37.0 44.8 50.9
(years) NBA 8.6 10.5 17.4 22.4
Average Stadium Tenure MLB 37.7 27.5 20.2 27.0 28.7
(years) NBA 7.7 7.6 13.0 15.3
Average Stadium Age MLB 30.0 24.7 19.7 26.2 28.3
NBA 18.6 14.2 17.1 18.1
Average Stadium Capacity MLB 42.0 45.5 48.9 51.9 51.6
NBA 13.8 15.9 17.1 17.9
Stadium Owned--Third Party MLB 0.025 0.06 0.065 0.04 0.04
NBA 0.22 0.16 0.09 0.06
Stadium Owned--Franchise MLB 0.788 0.50 0.22 0.20 0.25
NBA 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.30
Stadium Owned--Publicly MLB 0.188 0.44 0.71 0.76 0.70
Owned NBA 0.60 0.66 0.74 0.64
Adjusted Average Annual MLB 1.09 1.14 1.34 1.76 2.07
Attendance  (millions) NBA 0.285 0.405 0.499 0.663
Attendance as Percent of MLB 32.0 30.9 33.8 41.9 49.5
Stadium Capacity NBA 50.4 62.1 71.1 90.3
County Move Probability MLB 0.031 0.020 0.008 0.000 0.000
NBA 0.055 0.031 0.013 0.000
Metro Move Probability MLB 0.031 0.015 0.008 0.000 0.000
NBA 0.055 0.026 0.008 0.000
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Average baseball stadium age declined from 30 to 20 years in the 1970’s as a host of new
stadiums and new franchises were established, rising again to 28 years in the 1990’s.  Basketball
arenas have had a similar trend and have risen by 4 years in average age since the 1970’s.  The
rising average age of stadiums in the 1990’s may explain why team owners are presently
clamoring for local governments to build new stadiums.  Baseball stadiums today are
approaching the average age experienced in the 1950’s, an era of owner discontent and franchise
movement and a time when teams abandoned old stadiums such as Braves Field, the Polo
Grounds, Ebbets Field, Sportsman’s Park, and Shibe Park.
And in addition to the unattractiveness of an older facility to fan attendance, owners have
an additional incentive to demand new facilities.  The rising demand for “luxury boxes” that
offer close viewing, catering, and other amenities at a premium price cannot be satisfied by older
stadiums with more “democratic” seating arrangements.  In addition, league rules that demand
revenue sharing with the visiting team for regular attendance but allow the owner to keep all
luxury box revenue further encourage this trend.  Also excluded from revenue sharing are the
“seat rights” that fans are commonly required to purchase when new facilities are built.
The trends in stadium ownership are very different for each sport.  The development of
new baseball stadiums in the 1960’s and 1970’s ended a long tradition of team ownership of
facilities.  Public ownership of stadiums rose from 19% in the 1950’s to 70% in the 1990’s.  For
basketball, franchise ownership of arenas has always been the exception.  During the early years
of the sport, many teams played in publicly-owned arenas, arenas owned by National Hockey
League teams, and college facilities.  In the last few years, however, teams such as Chicago,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Sacramento, and Utah have built their own new arenas.  The
owner of the Washington Wizards franchise (formerly the Bullets) is even moving from one
team-owned arena to a downtown facility that he will also own.  There has even been a modest
revival in baseball teams building their own facilities, including the Texas Rangers and the
Cleveland Indians franchises.
Attendance per team has risen significantly for both sports, especially basketball.
Baseball attendance has risen 2.2% per year between 1960-95, while basketball attendance has
risen by 3.2% per year.  Thus, where as the average baseball team in the 1960’s had 4 times the
annual attendance of the average basketball team, by the 1990’s the multiple has fallen to 3.
Given that baseball teams have approximately twice as many home dates and three times the
stadium capacity, this means that average per game attendance at baseball is only 50% greater,
despite having stadiums with almost three times the capacity.
The rise in the popularity of basketball is also noted by looking at attendance in relation
to stadium capacity.  According to our data, basketball attendance in the 1990’s was running at
90.3% of arena capacity, while for baseball, the figure was 49.5%.  Both capacity figures are
significantly higher than during previous decades, although the trends are different.
For baseball, the takeoff in capacity utilization has occurred entirely in the last 20 years.
Until the 1970’s only one-third of baseball seats were occupied on average, whereas today the
number is one half.  For basketball, the rise in attendance/capacity ratio has been strong in each
of the decades surveyed, from 50% to 62% to 71% to 90%.  Whether due to the development of
prominent stars or good promotion, basketball has developed a large fan base.
One possible explanation for the rise in baseball attendance might be the construction of
smaller single-use facilities, in some cases by private owners.  These new stadiums, including the
Ballpark at Arlington, Camden Yards in Baltimore, Coors Field in Denver, and Jacobs Field in
Cleveland, have been acclaimed by architects and baseball enthusiasts and a boon to team
attendance.  In three of these four cases, the new stadium replaced a larger multiple-use stadium
whose configuration was judged poor for baseball viewing.
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B.  Franchise Moves
Finally, the variable indicating the number of moves per franchise year is measured in
two ways.  County move probability views any movement in franchise location from one county
to another as a move, including, for example, a team moving from a downtown arena to a
suburban arena.  The second measure, metro move probability, only records a move from one
metropolitan statistical area to another.  In practice, there is very little difference, and we focus
on the metro move variable for our analysis.
For both sports, franchise relocation is a rarity, with no recorded moves in baseball for
over twenty years.  In Table 1, we calculate the number of moves per franchise year and find it
declining for both sports over time.  For baseball, there were a flurry of moves in the 1950’s
following decades of stability.  The Braves, Browns, and Athletics each left their hometown
(which they shared with another team) to a smaller metropolitan area where they were the only
team in town.  And in 1958, the Dodgers and the Giants both left the New York metropolitan
area, re-establishing their rivalry in California.  The advent of airplane travel in the 1950’s made
long distance traveling by teams more feasible and opened up the set of possible team locations.
Moves in baseball became somewhat rarer in the 60’s and 70’s, perhaps in part because
expansion soaked up the demand for franchises in growing parts of the country.  Washington,
DC lost both the original Senators and the expansion Senators to Minneapolis and Dallas,
respectively.  The Braves and Athletics continued the movement to new locations, and the ill-
fated Pilots left Seattle for Milwaukee, in part because Seattle had a poor stadium, in part
because they finished 33 games out of first place.
Table 2
Inter-Metropolitan Franchise Moves
Sport Year Franchise MSA of Origin MSA of Destination
Baseball 1953 Braves Boston Milwaukee
1954 Browns/Orioles St. Louis Baltimore
1955 Athletics Philadelphia Kansas City
1958 Dodgers New York Los Angeles
Giants New York San Francisco
1961 Senators/Twins Washington, DC Minneapolis
1966 Braves Milwaukee Atlanta
1968 Athletics Kansas City Oakland
1970 Pilots Seattle Milwaukee
1972 Senators/Rangers Washington, DC Dallas
Basketball 1960 Lakers Minneapolis Los Angeles
1962 Warriors Philadelphia San Francisco
1963 Zephyrs/Bullets Chicago Baltimore
Nationals/76ers Syracuse Philadelphia
1968 Hawks St. Louis Atlanta
1971 Rockets San Diego Houston
1972 Royals/Kings Cincinnati Kansas City
1973 Bullets Baltimore Washington
1978 Braves/Clippers Buffalo San Diego
1979 Jazz New Orleans Salt Lake City
1984 Clippers San Diego Los Angeles
1985 Kings Kansas City Sacramento
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For basketball, many of the early moves in the league reflected the maturation of a
business enterprise that was founded in small cities like Fort Wayne, Rochester, Syracuse,
Minneapolis, and Waterloo, Iowa.  The Lakers’ move west in 1960 was soon followed by the
Warriors.  The Warriors move opened up the Philadelphia market for Syracuse.  Another of the
original NBA franchises that has made several moves is the Royals/Kings franchise which was
originally based in Rochester, moved to Cincinnati in 1957, transferred to Kansas City, played
some of its home games in Omaha, and has finally settled in Sacramento.
As the league expanded in the 1960’s and 1970’s, many new franchises suffered from
poor attendance and losing records, and moved after few years.  The failed Packers/Zephyrs
franchise in Chicago left for a new arena in Baltimore, and moved to a new arena in suburban
Washington eight years later.  The Rockets left San Diego for Houston after four seasons, and the
Jazz left New Orleans for Salt Lake City after 5 seasons.  The Braves/Clippers franchise has
made two moves and as the secondary franchise in Los Angeles may move again.
But for both sports, the likelihood of moving was ever declining.  In the 1950’s, the
probability that a baseball team would move in a given year was 3%, which was cut in half by
the 1960’s and in half again by the 1970’s.  No baseball team has moved since the Senators left
for Texas in 1972.  For basketball, moves were quite common in the 1960’s, 5.5%, fell to 2.6%
in the 1970’s, and no team has moved since 1985.  In the next section, we will conduct a
statistical analysis to explain the trends in franchise mobility.
C.  Metropolitan Markets
Another  key determinant of franchise moves is the absence of franchises in large
metropolitan areas.  For both baseball and basketball (and unlike football which only has a
national television contract), the incentive to move to a larger metropolitan area is considered
crucial for individual team owners.  And as Quirk and Fort (1992) have pointed out, sports
leagues have a collective interest in insuring that the largest metropolitan areas have franchises,
so as to preclude competitive leagues and capture the monopoly rents that come from being the
sole professional league.
In Table 3, we present a picture of how franchises in the four sports leagues are
distributed by metropolitan areas, ranked in order of population.  The second column provides an
indicator of how “saturated” each metropolitan area is by calculating a metropolitan population
per franchise indicator.
In general, sports teams locate in large metropolitan areas.  The five metropolitan areas
above 6 million in population each have five or more franchises whereas franchises between 2
and 6 million people have between two and four franchises.  Below 2 million, no franchise has
more than 2 franchises.
Among the various sports, widely different location strategies are chosen.  For baseball,
where local attendance and television markets are paramount, all the large metropolitan areas
have teams.  A baseball team has 81 home dates, plays in a large facility, and has home games
every other day during the six month season.  By comparison, hockey and basketball have half as
many games, have stadiums one-third the capacity, and play much less frequently.
All 26 US-based baseball franchises are located in metro areas ranked in the top 25.  The
only top 25 metro areas without a baseball team are Phoenix, Tampa, and Portland, and the
leagues will be establishing new franchises in Phoenix and Tampa.  In a previous paper (Mildner
and Strathman, 1996), we demonstrated that the movement of baseball franchises to the midwest
and western cities in the 1950’s resulted from the development of airplane travel and the rise of
those metropolitan areas in population.
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Table 3
Sports Franchises by Metro Areas, 1997





MLB NBA NHL NFL Total
1. New York 19.80 2.20 2 2 3 2 9
2. Los Angeles 15.30 2.55 2 2 2 6
3. Chicago 8.53 1.71 2 1 1 1 5
4. Washington 7.05 1.41 1 1 1 2 5
5. San Francisco 6.51 1.09 2 1 1 2 6
6. Philadelphia 5.96 1.49 1 1 1 1 4
7. Boston 5.50 1.38 1 1 1 1 4
8. Detroit 5.26 1.32 1 1 1 1 4
9. Dallas 4.36 1.09 1 1 1 1 4
10. Houston 4.10 2.05 1 1 2
11. Miami 3.41 0.85 1 1 1 1 4
12. Atlanta 3.33 1.11 1 1 * 1 3
13. Seattle 3.23 1.08 1 1 1 3
14. Cleveland 2.90 1.45 1 1 2
15. Minneapolis 2.69 0.90 1 1 * 1 3
16. San Diego 2.63 1.32 1 1 2
17. St. Louis 2.54 0.85 1 1 1 3
18. Phoenix 2.47 0.82 * 1 1 1 3
19. Pittsburgh 2.40 0.80 1 1 1 3
20. Denver 2.19 0.55 1 1 1 1 4
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Table 3 (cont.)
Sports Franchises by Metro Areas. 1997





MLB NBA NHL NFL Total
21. Tampa 2.16 1.08 * 1 1 2
22. Portland 1.98 1.98 1 1
23. Cincinnati 1.89 0.95 1 1 2
24. Kansas City 1.65 0.83 1 1 2
25. Milwaukee 1.64 0.82 1 1 2
26. Sacramento 1.59 1.59 1 1
27. Norfolk 1.53 na 0
28. Indianapolis 1.46 0.73 1 1 2
29. San Antonio 1.44 1.44 1 1
Columbus 1.42 na * 0
Orlando 1.36 1.36 1 1
New Orleans 1.31 1.31 1 1
Charlotte 1.26 0.43 1 1 2
Buffalo 1.19 0.60 1 1 2
Salt Lake 1.18 1.18 1 1
Greensboro 1.11 1.11 1# 1
Nashville 1.07 na * # 0
Memphis 1.06 1.06 1# 1
Raleigh 0.97 na # 0
Jacksonville 0.97 0.97 1 1
Green Bay 0.20 0.20 1 1
Total US cities 26 27 20 30 103
Canadian Cities 2 2 6 0 10
*   MLB and the NHL have announced plans for expansions between now and the year 2000.  MLB will have new
teams in Tampa and Phoenix for the 1998 season.  The NHL will have new franchises in Nashville (1998-99),
Atlanta (1999-2000), Minneapolis (2000-2001) and Columbus, Ohio (2000-2001)
#   The Houston NFL franchise and the Hartford NHL franchise will play the 1997 seasons in Memphis and
Greensboro, respectively, and will be named the Tennessee Oilers and the Carolina Hurricanes.  The Oilers are
having a stadium constructed and will move to Nashville for the 1999 season.  The Hurricanes will move to Raleigh
for the 1999-2000 season when a new arena has been constructed.
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For basketball and hockey, the loss for being located in smaller metropolitan areas is less
severe due to the smaller number of dates and seating capacity.  And because the seasons for the
two sports almost perfectly overlap, teams are reluctant to locate in the same city hosting a team
in the other sport, presumably for fear of saturating the market for fall and winter indoor sports.
This reluctance is somewhat remarkable given that hockey teams and basketball teams can
experience economies of scope by sharing sporting facilities and have developed scheduling
arrangements that avoid same night event conflicts.
Thus, while 10 of the 11 largest metropolitan areas in the US have both hockey and
basketball franchises, for metropolitan areas ranked 12 through 29, only Phoenix (#18) and
Denver (#20) have franchises in both sports.  Those anomalies may be explained both fast
population growth in those metro areas and anticipation that they will become larger markets in
the long run.
The table also offers some insight on where possible future sports expansions might take
place for hockey and basketball.  Houston (#10), Atlanta (#12), and Seattle (#13) stand out as
large metropolitan areas that might be ready for hockey, their second fall-winter indoor sport.
Atlanta was recently awarded a new NHL franchise, and is building a new basketball/hockey
arena.  An offer from Houston was rejected in the recent NHL decision on new franchises largely
because of the age of the current arena, whereas Seattle completed its 17,000 seat Key Arena in
1995.
The only medium size metropolitan areas with hockey but not basketball are St. Louis
(#17), Pittsburgh (#19), and Tampa (#21).  St. Louis and Pittsburgh are slow-growing
metropolitan areas that seem likely to fall in size rankings over time.  More attractive candidates
might be San Diego (#16), Cincinnati (#23), Kansas City (#24), or Norfolk (#27) which stand out
as large metropolitan areas without either hockey or basketball.  San Diego and Norfolk both
have the advantage of being fast-growing metropolitan areas, however San Diego has the
dubious distinction of attracting and losing two basketball franchises (Rockets and Clippers).
Perhaps the most likely candidate, now that Toronto and Vancouver have received NBA
franchises, would be Montreal.  With a metropolitan population of 3.32 million, Montreal would
rank as high as Atlanta in our US metro population table, has a newly built indoor arena, and
would have a natural rivalry with the Toronto franchise.
For football, the need to locate in large metropolitan areas is a league concern and not a
significant team owner concern.  This is because fans are willing to drive longer distance for
weekend football games (hence, the market is regional, not metropolitan) and because of the
importance of the national television contract in team revenue.  Thus, teams are able to survive in
small metropolitan areas such as Green Bay and Jacksonville, and teams can make franchise
shifts to smaller markets, such as the Rams move from Los Angeles to St. Louis, or the Oilers
move from Houston to Memphis (and ultimately to Nashville).  In those cases, the desire to
reduce stadium rents and increase luxury box and concession revenue were more important
factors.
The NFL’s concern for franchise location is much greater than individual owners.  Failure
by a league to have a presence in major television markets can lead to new league formation and
a loss of monopoly rent.  This has happened twice before to the NFL, most recently when the
American Football League established franchises in the then under-served markets of  Boston,
New York, Houston, Denver, and Buffalo, and later expanded to Miami.
Thus, the Table 3 exposes a potential market for a rival football league as the large
metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Houston, and Cleveland currently have no franchise, and two
major markets, New York and Chicago, may be considered under-served.  We suspect, however,
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that this gap is really a temporary disequilibrium and the league will undergo expansion to these
cities in upcoming years.  Nevertheless, the failure of the league to control franchise mobility (as
baseball and hockey have done) represents an importance weakness in league structure.
IV.  Statistical Analysis.
Franchise relocation is analyzed using a logit model of the following structure:
P(Mi=1) = ZiBn + B1Si + ei
The probability of decision to move in year i, Mi, depends upon a variety of franchise
factors Zi (metropolitan population growth, annual attendance growth, team’s winning
percentage, and league-wide team expansion, among others), municipal stadium/arena
ownership, Si, where Si=1 if the city owns the stadium and Si=0 otherwise.  Our expectation is
that the coefficient on Si would be positive indicating an increased likelihood of moving relative
to city ownership.  Other variables test alternative hypotheses to predict the incentive to move,
such as falling attendance, losing seasons, declining metropolitan economies, or stagnant
metropolitan population sizes.
Table 4 reports separate results for baseball and basketball teams moving between
metropolitan areas.  The only two statistically significant variables in the baseball equation were
the negative time trend and the positive effect of public stadium ownership on teams leaving,























Number of New Franchises in Year -0.218
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Log Likelihood -60.8 -68.2
Log Likelihood (B) -41.7 -55.1
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (8 d.f.) 38.3 26.3
McFadden’s R2 0.32 0.19
N 1,026 681
Of the other variables reaching low levels of statistical significance, team winning
percentage (3 year moving average) was weakly negative and team attendance was weakly
positive.  The winning percentage result is intuitive (that winning teams stay put) but the
attendance figure is not.  One possibility is that the teams leaving the highly attended New York
region may skew this result.  Of course, that begs the question of why an owner would leave a
high attendance city.
The basketball equation showed no effect of public ownership.  One possible explanation
is that indoor arenas have a value for hosting musical events and other sports, whereas baseball
stadiums are highly specialized facilities.  Hence, the “salvage value” of abandoned arenas
means that a basketball team that owns a stadium might have less of a mobility constraint than a
baseball team.  Short of attempting additional specifications and constructing other variables, we
conclude that stadium ownership does not seem to be a significant factor in determining
movements by basketball franchises.
Unlike baseball, metropolitan population and average annual attendance were important
factors in basketball team moves.  Thus, teams in small or declining metropolitan areas and low
attendance are the franchises that would most likely to candidates for moving.
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A related question that we investigated is what conditions determine public ownership of
stadiums and arenas.  Table 5 reports the results of logit regressions on the probability of public
ownership of stadiums for baseball and for basketball.  This model performs much better than the
relocation equation, with similar results for both sports.
First, we find a general trend toward public ownership over time, although this is only
significant for baseball.  Second, we find that teams with low annual attendance are in public
stadiums.  This may reflect the idea that expansion teams are more likely in public stadiums and
their poor performance may be associated with low attendance.  Third, teams which have only
been located in a metropolitan area for a short period of time are more likely to be in publicly-
owned stadiums.  This may reflect the pattern that only cities that build public stadiums attract
new franchises.    Finally, recent acquisition of the franchise by a new owner is associated with
playing in a publicly-owned stadium.  Each of these results points to the importance of municipal
ownership in attracting new teams.
Lastly, we examine the determinants of annual attendance, seeing that as a proxy for team
net revenue.  In Table 6, we present a regression equation that predicts the log of “adjusted”
annual attendance.  For baseball, we adjusted for the effect of strike years and for both sports, we
adjusted for the increase in the number of games per season.
Results for the two sports are very similar.  Stadium age is negatively correlated with fan
attendance, however the pattern of causation isn’t entirely clear.  Fans may prefer new ballparks
and arenas, but it’s also true that high fan attendance may generate the revenues required to
support new stadium construction.  Fan attendance rises with a winning record (again, there is a
weak case for reverse causation).  Larger cities have higher attendance, and attendance is rising
over time in both sports.
13
Table 5

































Log Likelihood -649.2 -429.9
Log Likelihood (B) -338.7 -364.8
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (8 d.f.) 620.9 130.2
McFadden’s R2 0.48 0.15
N 1,026 681
Metropolitan tenure, which we interpret as a tradition effect, has a significant impact in
baseball and not in basketball.  This may reflect the newness of basketball’s popularity and the
high frequency of team moves in earlier years.  Note that absolute value for the coefficient on
metropolitan tenure for baseball is much smaller than the  coefficient on stadium age.  This
indicates that a team moving to a new metropolitan area will likely gain more attendance from
the playing in a new stadium than they lose from the loss of the tradition effect.  This may
explain why so many long-established franchises like the Giants and Dodgers were willing to
leave long established homes for the sake of a new, attractive ballpark.
A second key difference in the two attendance equations is the significance of the
capacity variable for basketball and not for baseball.  As discussed earlier, basketball arenas have
consistently been playing to higher capacity utilization levels than baseball, with the current level
at 90%.  Under those conditions, the team with the higher attendance is the one with more seats.
The need to upgrade facilities to meet rising demand may also explain why basketball arenas are
so much newer than baseball stadiums.  Baseball, on the other hand, requires the additional









































The results of this research will help inform local officials about the feasibility of using
subsidized stadium development as a means of attracting and maintaining sports franchises.  For
baseball franchises, team ownership of a stadium makes the franchise less likely to move.  Cities
with publicly-owned facilities may want to explore privatization.
The best prospects for cities seeking to attract a new baseball franchise are teams
currently playing in public facilities.  Even teams that own their own facilities might be attracted
if a city has a new facility and the land occupied by the current stadium has a high alternative
use.  A second consideration would be to identify teams that had poor winning records since they
are somewhat more likely to move.  That may be sound attractive, but it assumes the objective is
to win a team, not just a winning team.
For basketball-seeking cities, the advice is less clear.  We do not yet have a useful model
of franchise relocation.  We know that teams are playing next to capacity.  We also know from
our equation, that teams draw better in large metropolitan areas with new stadiums.  Part of the
reason for the poor performance of the relocation equation may be the number of expansion
franchises in recent years.  This suggests a different model for future research, predicting where a
league will expand its membership.
Finally, we want to exercise a word of caution to city officials who see economic
development and political gains from attracting new franchises.  As others have noted, sports is
just one of many entertainment outlets.  Consultants’ estimates of the multiplier effect of sports
expenditures are frequently exaggerated.  While making investments in new facilities make
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influence some team location decisions on the margin, we suspect these effects are small and the
benefits are fleeting.
Notes
1.  The moving franchises (and their destination city) are the Cleveland Browns (NFL,
Baltimore), the Los Angeles Raiders (NFL, Oakland), Los Angeles Rams (NFL, St. Louis), the
Winnipeg Jets (NHL, Phoenix), the Quebec Nordiques (NHL, Colorado), the Minnesota North
Stars (NHL, Dallas), and the Hartford Whalers (NHL, Greensboro-Charlotte).  In addition, the
Houston Oilers (NFL) are scheduled to Memphis and later to Nashville.
2.  Estimates of franchise values are reported in Quirk and Fort (1992).  The highest values for
each of the major leagues are for basketball, the Boston Celtics, $120 million (1986), for
baseball, the New York Mets, $100 million (1986), and for football, the New York Giants, $150
million.  As for hockey, the NHL recently announced 4 new expansion teams, with the entry
price set at $80 million.
By comparison, seven new sports stadiums and arenas have been built in Baltimore, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Nashville, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Seattle for between $250 million and $525
million.  (Malkin, 1997)
3.  The reason for the differences in time periods is that professional basketball was an unstable
business enterprise until the early 1960’s.  The NBA merged with other leagues in the late 1940’s
and early 1950’s and clearly had a less prominent attention in the public eve than college
basketball.  In addition, data for the NBA prior to 1960, particularly on attendance is very
difficult.  Thus, while the baseball data is comprehensive, there are 12 missing team-year
observations for basketball, largely due to missing data on team attendance Finally, pro
basketball in the 1950’s was frequently played in neutral cities or in doubleheaders where
attendance and stadium data becomes less meaningful.
The missing observations are the St. Louis Hawks, 1960-67; the Syracuse Nationals, 1960-61,
and the Chicago Packers/Zephyrs, 1961-62.  The year refers to the beginning year of the season.
References
Robert A. Baade and Richard F. Dye, “Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical
Review,” Economic Development Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, August, 1988.
Robert A. Baade and Richard F. Dye, “The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on
Metropolitan Area Development,” Growth and Change, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1990.
Euchner, Charles, Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, “Public Subsidies for Private Purposes,” Economic
Commentary, April 15, 1991.
Malkin, Michelle, “If They Build It, You Will Pay,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1997.
Gerard C.S. Mildner and James G. Strathman, “Stadium Ownership and Franchise Incentives to
Relocate,” paper presented at the Western Economics Association, San Francisco, June 30, 1997.
16
Erle Norton, “Football at Any Cost: One City’s Mad Chase for an NFL Franchise,” Wall Street
Journal, October 13, 1995
James Quirk and Rodney D. Fort, Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Sports Franchise Game: Cities in Pursuit of Sports Franchises,
Events, Stadiums, and Arenas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).
Neil J. Sullivan, “Big League Welfare,” New York Times, November 4, 1995.
J.E. Vader, “A Ballpark Would be Great--Just Don’t Ask Us to Pay,” The Oregonian,  October,
16, 1995
